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1. Introduction 
Together with the normalization of the idea that migration is irregular and that it 
should be managed and restricted (Jansen et al. 2015: xi), the conveying of 
information on migration across the Mediterranean in terms of emergency, disaster, 
flows and numbers has become standard. Particularly in the European spring, the 
image of ‘swelling masses of desperate Africans fleeing poverty and war at home are 
trying to enter Europe illegally’ (IOM 2008: 11) is drawn upon. In April of this year 
for example, President of the European Council Donald Tusk warned the Members 
of the European Parliament that, concerning ‘the Central Mediterranean route … 
the numbers of would-be migrants in Libya are alarming’ (European Council 2016). 
The UNHCR estimates that in Libya ‘at least 100,000 migrants’ are ‘packed into 
towns and cities along its western coast’ (Stephen 2016) waiting for the weather to 
clear and to cross the sea to Europe. Military advisor for UN Libya envoy Martin 
Kobler claims this number to be ‘a million of potential migrants’ (DW 2016).  
Similarly, in May 2014 Secretary of State Fred Teeven - a Dutch politician of the 
liberal VVD party who until March 2015 retained the portfolio Safety and Justice – 
evoked a dramatized image of migration across the Mediterranean. In the television 
show Eén op Eén, in which he was interviewed by journalist and talk show host Sven 
Kockelmann, the Secretary of State deliberately ‘rang the alarm bell’ (Eén op Eén 
2014). Supposedly ‘thousands of migrants’ were to enter the Netherlands every 
month in 2014, ‘leading up to 65,000 people yearly’ (idem). Apart from the ‘alarming 
figures,’ the Secretary of State spoke of his fear of ‘organized human trafficking,’ 
particularly of Eritreans, although ‘it might very well be that there are are people 
from Ethiopia amongst them’ (idem). As a solution, the Secretary of State made an 
appeal to ‘people working in logistics, people working in trains, in public transport, 
or international transportation’ to ‘open their eyes and ears’ to ‘any suspicious 
behaviour’ and ‘inform the police and military police’ (idem). What was to be noted 
for example is ‘how people are dressed’ and ‘their looks’ (idem). When the interviewer 
summarized Teeven’s position by rhetorically asking ‘So you are summoning all 
Dutch people on the road to keep their eyes open to anything that may point to 
human trafficking or to asylum-seekers from Africa?’ - thus suggesting that all 
citizens (and not only specific professions) were required to attend to visual aspects 
of those people now tainted with suspicion  –  the Secretary of State did not correct 
him (idem). In a Parliamentary Debate the following day, the Secretary of State 
furthermore foregrounded ‘a certain modus operandi concerning the behaviour of 
aliens, the way in which they are transported, or the way that is being communicated 
during the transportation’ (House of Representatives 2014a) as relevant factors to 
keep an eye on. ‘Information from society can improve visibility’ (House of 
Representatives 2014b), he later clarified in a letter to Parliament. 
The call upon citizens to help the government in controlling unwanted migration is 
not an isolated anecdote. Individual citizens increasingly take part in mobility 
regulation, without being required to do so by their profession or affiliation. In the 
United States for example, citizens contribute to the surveillance and detection of 
migrants and to the enforcement of migration laws by calling anonymous tip lines, 
watching live streams of cameras monitoring border areas and reporting on suspicious 
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behaviour, and joining border vigilantes or immigration posses (Walsh 2014). 
Although in Europe such citizens’ initiatives have received little scholarly attention, 
in several Member States it does happen that citizens are invited to report on 
migrants. In the UK, ‘if you think someone is living or working in the UK illegally, 
or is employing someone who isn’t allowed to work in the UK,’ such an ‘immigration 
crime’ can be reported through contacting the Home Office (Home Office 2015). In 
Hungary, in the summer of 2015, the mayor of the village of Asotthalom ordered 
village auxiliaries to trace and catch migrants and hand them over to the police (Toth 
2015). In Sweden, the Migration Authority in 1999 launched the project Argus, an 
initiative that invited citizens to inform the Authority of ‘dubious immigrants’ – i.e. 
those ‘suspected of fraud (housing, employment, and social allowance), and/or 
assuming a false identity, giving fake asylum claims, and bogus family affiliations’ 
(Tesfahuney and Dahlstedt 2008).  
Apart from appeals to individual citizens, Lahav and Giraudon (2000; 2006) have 
signalled an international trend in which states seek to control migration by 
delegating authority to private and societal actors. Hospitals, schools, welfare officers, 
employers, and airline carriers are being included in these implementation processes 
(Lahav and Guiraudon 2000: 184-188) and thus provide input to policies that aim 
towards migration management (Lahav and Guiraudon 2006: 211).   
These outward delegations of responsibility for migration policies to citizens as well 
as to private and societal actors do not imply that governments fully transfer the 
responsibility to control migrant illegality to civil society. In the Dutch case, the 
government aims at preventing and managing ‘illegal’ migration, for example through 
pre-entry measures in ‘countries of origin’, border controls by the Border 
Management Renewal Program (‘Programma Vernieuwing Grensmanagement’, 
VGM), countering ‘illegal residency’ through controls by Mobile Security 
Monitoring (‘Mobiel Toezicht Veiligheid’, MTV), and facilitating return through 
programs by the Return and Departure Agency (Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek’, 
DT&V). The observation here is rather that, in addition to these formal 
instruments, the Dutch government appeals to citizens and to private and societal 
actors in managing what they consider to be ‘illegal residency’ and ‘illegal migration’. 
‘Government,’ then, refers not only to the state but rather to the set of practices and 
technologies of governing which operate across distinctions of state and non-state 
actors (Barry 2001: 175).  
Using the qualification of ‘unwanted’ when referring to migrant ‘illegality’ over the 
course of this article – instead of ‘illegal’ or ‘irregular’ - emphasizes the constructed 
character of certain forms of migrant illegality as being problematic. Illegality is ‘a 
juridical status that entails a social relation to the state,’ as such being ‘a preeminently 
political identity’ (De Genova 2002: 422). The widely-used adjectives ‘illegal’ and 
‘irregular’ would obscure this social, political and legal construction by suggesting 
the observation of a given social phenomenon (Düvell 2011: 276). Moreover, not all 
migrant ‘illegality’ or ‘irregularity’ is considered problematic in practice. For example, 
the American student working off the books in a London pub does not appear on 
the radar screens (Walters 2010: 85). 
This article aims at analysing which forms of border-crossing and residency are 
considered problematic. Moreover, images of migrant ‘illegality’ as evoked as well as 
images promoting outwardly delegated forms of governing migration are put under 
scrutiny. Apart from problematizing the image of the unwanted migrant as called 
upon in mobilizing civil society, this article redescribes how ‘responsibilization’ of 
non-state actors redistributes power by using Foucault’s analysis of governmentality 
as a conceptual framework. Furthermore, the appeal made by former Secretary of 
State Teeven will be contextualized by Dutch migration policies aimed at countering 
migrant illegality since the 1990s as well the promotion of active citizenship since 
the 1970s; the assumption is that both developments shape the conditions 
surrounding the possibility of ‘responsibilization’ as a tactic of governance in the 
Netherlands. By doing so, the forms of thought, conduct and subjectivity that 
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constitute responsibilization of non-state actors in the field of controlling unwanted 
migration will be evaluated. 
 
2. Governmentality, biopolitics and biopower 
Governmentality, characteristic of the final work of Foucault (1976 – 1984), is as 
much a historical notion referring to a particular regime of power functioning as 
constitutive for the modern state (Foucault 2007: 108), as well as a more general 
concept referring to the ‘strategic field of power relations in their mobility, 
transformability and reversibility’ (Foucault 2005: 252). Most relevant for the 
purposes of this article is the latter conceptualization: governmentality as a set of 
power instruments that is characterized by its fluidity and aimed at the population 
(Foucault 2007: 105). Power instruments, here, are not one-directional, top-down 
law-like instruments of government, but rather an assemblage of diverse tactics that 
aim to control the people as a whole. ‘Diverse’ here means that there is a number of 
different ways in which these ‘tactics’ operate (Foucault 2007: 99). As such, 
governmental power does not only operate through institutions, but also through 
procedures, analyses, reflections and calculations (Foucault 2007: 144). 
Governmentality thus ‘cuts out’ a very specific domain of power relations (Senellart 
2007: 502), branching itself throughout the whole of civil society.  
Key to the set of governmental power instruments is biopolitics, concerning the 
regulation of the population in terms of a species – i.e. the biological elements of 
population. Intertwined with the capillary character of power as it operates in 
governmentality, the power at work in biopolitics consists of a ‘multiplicity of force 
relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate,’ meaning that power is not 
some sort of an externality, but rather an ‘infiltrated’ force that is interwoven with 
its very object – the population (Foucault 1990: 92). Thus, as power resides inside 
the system itself, it comes from ‘everywhere’ (Foucault 1990: 93): ‘power is exercised 
from innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations. 
[…] Power comes from below’ (Foucault 1990: 94). This definition of power makes 
clear that power is not only capillary (Walters 2012: 9) but also actively (re)produced 
by (non-state) actors. In Society must be defended, Foucault emphasises this point 
by stating that ‘Power is exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply 
circulate in those networks; they are in a position to both submit to and exercise 
power. They are never the inert or consenting targets of power; they are always its 
relays’ (Foucault 2003: 29). People are thus not only the object of power; they also 
practice it. 
Although governmentality and biopolitics were only introduced in Foucault’s later 
work, it does not exclude the workings of disciplinary power - the latter being central 
to Foucault’s middle-period work (1970-1976). Disciplinary power refers to a broad 
a set of techniques of surveillance (i.e. what Foucault coins the microphysics of 
power), aimed at the normalization of individuals. Whereas biopolitical power targets 
the population, disciplinary power targets the individual body (Foucault 2003: 249). 
Surveillance objectifies individuals through (permanent and invisible) registration. 
The crux of disciplinary power, then, is that the person it is practiced on internalizes 
the discipline; as such, power automatically functions (Foucault 1973: 201). 
Disciplinary power is therefore individualizing: it encapsulates and isolates 
individuals. Indeed, disciplinary power and biopolitical power do not operate at the 
same level and are historically established at different times (Foucault 2003: 249), 
but ‘they are not mutually exclusive and can be articulated with each other’ (ibid.: 
250). Th¬¬is is emphasized by Foucault’s introduction of the concept of biopower 
as a type of power that emerges at the intersection of the individualizing effects of 
disciplinary power and the massifying effects of biopolitical power (Rasmussen 211: 
36-37).  
As political power is ‘capillary,’ meaning that multiple agencies and techniques all 
relay and as such exercise force, the researcher’s focus should not be limited to the 
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‘immediate’ actions of the state. Instead, (s)he should trace how power branches and 
‘sway[s] throughout society by means of a ramifying apparatus of control’ (Miller and 
Rose 2008: 26-27). Presupposing that the population belongs to a space of 
governance, the concept of governmentality is then an analytic lens that may reveal 
the ways in which political power is located outside of institutional politics. 
 
3. Calling for citizens to report on ‘illegal’ migrants: the tactic of 
responsibilization 
What makes the empirical starting point of this article particularly interesting is that 
citizens are deliberately requested to engage in the surveillance of ‘illegal’ migrants, 
and that private and societal actors are professionally required to implement policies 
that aim to restrict the ‘illegal’ entry and residence of migrants. In addition to the 
concept ‘governmentality’, which provides an ontology of governmental power and 
as such describes the distribution and effects of power in relations between state and 
non-state actors, the concept of ‘responsibilization’ (O’Malley and Palmer 1996; Rose 
1999; Garland 2001; Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; 2013) refers to explicit and 
administrative appeals to individuals, private sector and semi-public sector, to bear 
responsibility for public tasks (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010: 699). However, both 
concepts are related: responsibilization is a tactic (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2013: 11) 
whose dynamic - concerning power distribution and effects - can be analysed with 
governmentality as an analytical framework.  
According to Schinkel and Van Houdt, a leading concept that is drawn on in 
responsibilization as a tactic is citizenship (Schinkel and Van Houdt 2013: 11). 
Through invoking images of what is considered to be good citizenship, the 
governmental state influences the behaviour of its citizens, and positions them in 
such a way that they serve the ends of government. Thus, what is promoted is not 
citizenship as juridical status that defines membership of a territory, but rather a 
normative judgment concerning what citizenship should entail (Schinkel and Van 
Houdt 2010). Characteristic of images of good citizenship since the ’70s in neoliberal 
policies in Western Welfare states is the ‘ethical principle of active citizenship’ (Rose 
2006: 159-160; Verhoeven and Tonkens 2013: 25). Through the ‛inculcation and 
shaping of ‛private’ responsibility,’ responsibilization assigns the community with a 
portion of the responsibility for resolving society’s needs for order, security, health 
and productivity (Rose 1999: 174). Importantly, this invoked image of the 
community is not a given; rather, it is itself produced by the mechanism of 
responsibilization. Responsibilization presupposes the distinction between those 
mature enough to enact active citizenship and those who fail to do so (Schinkel and 
Van Houdt 2013: 14). The figure of community then only represents the former 
group as it is imagined; a collective of self-entrepreneurs who attach themselves to 
the value of individual responsibility.  
In the Netherlands, the move towards an ‛activating welfare state’ can be traced back 
in the political discourse from the ’70s onwards (Kampen et al. 2013: 11). Van Houdt 
(2014) demonstrates in his dissertation how, in Dutch safety politics, citizens are 
increasingly asked to get involved with policy implementation. The developments in 
this branch of politics are relevant to the current purposes, both administratively - 
because asylum and immigration policies in the Netherlands are dealt with by the 
Ministry of Safety and Justice - and theoretically - because of the increasing 
criminalization of migrants (e.g. Commissioner for Human Rights 2010) and the 
emerging migration-security complex (e.g. Bigo 2002; Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; 
Huysmans 2000; Walters 2008; Walters 2010). Starting his analysis with the 1985 
report Society and Crime, Van Houdt shows how citizens are asked to contribute to 
‘fighting the mass manifestation of crime’ (House of Representatives 1985), how 
cooperation between state and non-state actors is cultivated (House of 
Representatives 1990), how citizens’ participation and social controls are encouraged 
(Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations 2002) and how 
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neighbourhoods and individual citizens are required to engage in ‛preventive 
partnerships’ (Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations 
2007). 
In the episode of Eén op Eén, Secretary of State Teeven in effect mobilizes society 
(Donzelot 1991) to ‘make visible the criminality linked with [‘illegal’ migration]’ (Eén 
op Eén 2014). Immediately reporting these signals to the police ‘really helps [the 
Ministry of Safety and Justice] forward’ (idem). From a governmentality perspective, 
then, this call for control, in which those working in logistics are being 
‘responsibilized’, can be considered to be among the tactics that are used by the 
governmental state to try to manage ‘illegal’ migrants from the capillaries of society 
via an information flow from below. Through the request to report on ‘illegal’ 
migrants to the police, ‘a newly conceptualized contractual relationship between 
citizen and state’ is established in which the citizen ‘cooperates with the state’ 
(Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010: 699-700). Interestingly, in parliamentary debates 
that followed the television broadcast, it became clear that the Secretary of State had 
at the time of broadcast not yet informed the Members of Parliament of the 
supposedly new dynamics of ‘illegal’ migration or his intended reaction. The 
Secretary of State thus first informed civil society (by mobilizing them through the 
media); a day later, he informed Parliament. Clearly, thus informing society and 
appealing to it in terms of surveillance is considered valuable as a strategy – as the 
temporal order indicates. By installing citizens - particularly those working in 
logistics - as agents that actively serve the ends of government, the government 
creates a capillary structure throughout civil society that encompasses a multiplicity 
of spatially distant actors.  
As it is still the state that initiates the ramification of power distribution and 
prescribes the desired actions to be taken in line with policy goals, the citizens’ 
actions do not compromise the sovereignty of the state. As Mezzadra and Neilson 
note, although sovereignty is subjected to the rationality of governmentality, it is 
transcendent to its devices because it retains its autonomy (Mezzadra and Neilson 
2013: 203-204). At the same time citizens may or may not be willing to engage in 
activities of surveillance and detection, or instead they may carry the activity of 
surveillance beyond its intended scope. How citizens act in practice when they 
encounter ‘illegal’ migrants is not a given, as they may cushion or counteract the 
government’s interests. The state, however, remains central in the establishment of 
its capillary power structure. To Ong (2006) sovereign power ‘depends on a network 
of regulatory entities that channel, correct, and scale human activities in order to 
produce effects of social order’ (Ong 2006: 100). In this sense, the appeal to citizens 
to get involved with the implementation of migration policies disaggregates and 
decentralizes state power, but at the same time reconfigures it (Mezzadra and Neilson 
2013: 192). 
 
4. The context of responsibilization in migrant management in the 
Netherlands: the Linking Act and the Foreigner Administration 
System 
The presentation of ‘illegal immigration’ as a highly disturbing fact of such severance 
that citizens are being alerted on national television fits with De Genova’s observation 
that  “migrant ‘illegality’ has risen to unprecedented prominence as a ‘problem’ in 
policy debates and as an object of border policing strategies for states around the 
world” (De Genova 2002: 419). In northern European states, Broeders and Engbersen 
observe an ‘avalanche’ of policy measures aimed at controlling and countering the 
presence of ‘irregular migrants’ (Broeders and Engbersen 2007: 1592). The 
presuppositions of such a magnitude of policies seems to be that unwanted migration 
is in fact governable through migration policies and that the ‘turbulence’ of 
‘unwanted migration’ can be ‘managed’ (Bojadžijev and Karakayalı 2010; Mezzadra 
and Neilson 2013, 179). Similarly, the call made by the Secretary of State is not an 
isolated episode concerning the delegation of control to civil-society actors. In the 
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Netherlands, part of the discouragement policy launched at the beginning of the 
1990s aimed at curbing illegal residence and combatting illegal employment (Van der 
Leun and Kloosterman 2006: 67), was to move the implementation of migration 
policies to Human Service Organisations (Hasenfeld 1983) such as providers of social 
benefits, health care, housing and education – all of which can be crucial for illegal 
migrants (Van der Leun 2006: 315). The appeal made to citizens in the Eén op Eén 
episode could then be understood in this broader context of outward delegation in 
the policy area of migration.   
In 1991, social-fiscal numbers were tied to residence status (Van der Leun 2006: 
313), meaning that employers could no longer accept ‘irregular’ migrants to legally 
work (Düvell 2011, 289). In 1995, the digital database VAS, meaning ‘Foreigner 
Administration System’ (‘Vreemdelingen Administratie Systeem’), was launched. In 
this system, data on ‘all foreigners residing in the Netherlands’ was contained 
(Leerkes 2006: 26). Importantly, the database enabled welfare departments to verify 
whether their clients are lawful residents and as such eligible to their services (Van 
der Leun 2003: 18). Moreover, it enabled housing corporations to check whether 
their clients had a residence permit and hence entitled to rent their apartments 
(Leerkes 2006: 26). In 1998 the Linking Act (‘Koppelingswet’) was enacted which 
allowed immigration service registration files, census bureau data, tax data and social 
security data to be cross-checked (Leerkes 2006: 26). As a consequence, a whole 
range of Human Service Organisations got access to an infrastructure that was 
installed to make their provisions - such as social benefits, housing, health care and 
education - conditional on residential status (Van der Leun 2006: 312).  
Van der Leun explicitly characterizes the Linking Act as a tactic of remote control 
(Zolberg 1999: 75), by which she refers to the manoeuvre in which ‘immigration 
policy moves to organizations that allocate social services’ (Van der Leun 2006: 315). 
As a side note, Leerkes observes that the Foreigner Administration System is 
illustrative of responsibilization, without however elaborating on this point and only 
referring to Garland (2001). The ways in which the Linking Act and the Foreigner 
Administration System as instances of responsibilization redistribute power and 
transform governance are not attended to. Importantly, by charging non-state actors 
such as house owners and those working in social welfare departments with the 
implementation of their policy goals, they are put in the position of executing the 
ends of government. As such, the state governs through community actors: 
throughout civil society the whole network of force-relaying entities is being put in 
place, that are themselves thus located in the very field in which they operate – i.e. 
the community as a whole. In the societal domain, ‘illegal’ migrants are thus being 
controlled from below through a network of Human Service Organisations in which 
power can come from everywhere. This multiplicity and diversity of power 
practitioners is exemplary for biopolitical power as it operates.  
The practice of citizens’ actions in response to the appeal made by the Secretary of 
State does not yield a set outcome – for they may cushion or counteract the 
government’s interests – and the same holds for actors working in Human Service 
Organisations. Based on interviews with human service workers before and after the 
enactment of the Linking Act, Van der Leun concludes that ‘norms, values and 
ideologies of implementers with a high degree of discretion and professional 
autonomy sometimes result in outcomes that run counter to the official policy goals’ 
and that ‘interests of the national government and local authorities do not always 
coincide’ (Van der Leun 2006: 323). However, Van der Leun’s argument seems to 
primarily lean on instances of support (Van der Leun 2006: 331) that outreaches 
official injunctions – i.e. human service workers not living up to the government’s 
mandate to exclude ‘illegal immigrants’ from public services. Inversely, the 
discretionary room may similarly allow for actions that otherwise depart from the 
national policy goals, including for example exclusion that is uncalled-for – e.g. 
doctors refusing to offer ‘essential medical care’ albeit being professionally required 
to do so. In any case, when policy practice exceeds the government’s intentions, the 
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national government may attempt to blame it on the respective non-state 
organization instead of being held accountable for failure, as their responsibility is 
delegated outwards. 
 
5. Racially representing unwanted migrants: massification and 
individualization 
Non-state actors are thus part of the capillary power network that relays 
governmental power, the object of power being the unwanted migrant. However, the 
unwanted migrant also becomes a subject by virtue of these power relations, for 
power, as Foucault shows, works constitutively (Foucault 2003: 30). What does the 
rhetorical figure of the migrant refer to, and to what extent does this rhetorical image 
overlap with migrants as human beings? 
The Linking Act and the Foreigner Administration system problematize migrant 
illegality in the broad sense, i.e. ‘the presence in the Netherlands of foreign nationals 
who are not in possession of a valid residence permit and are therefore obliged to 
leave the country of unlawful stay’ (Düvell 2011: 284). Some migrants are considered 
‘illegal’ because they crossed the border ‘illegally,’ whereas others arrived on tourist 
visas and overstayed or became ‘illegal’ when they were refused refugee status 
(Leerkes 2009: 16). However, on television, the Secretary of State evokes a very 
specific image of migrant ‘illegality’ by linking it with ‘organised human trafficking’ 
and representing migrant illegality with observable or audible characteristics of 
migrants –dress, looks, behaviour and speech which citizens are required to carefully 
attend to and report on.  
This figure of migrant ‘illegality,’ brought up as pointers and clues concerning what 
citizens should administer to, reinforces a massification of unwanted migrants. The 
Eén op Eén episode can be interpreted in terms of creating ‘caesura within a 
population’ (Foucault 2003: 255). In this particular case, the caesura is based on 
visible and audible observables of a presupposed group, establishing a distinctive 
criterion of which people should be met with suspicion and which people should 
not. In any case, establishing unwanted migrants as a group assumes homogeneity, 
under-communicates diversity and does not allow for self-identifications other than 
that of political movement. The fragmenting power that subdivides groups, however, 
does not only abstract from migrants as human beings; it creates divides based on of 
the category of race (Foucault 2003: 254-263) which is presented as identifiable 
through physical characteristics of a supposed group.  
Crucially, it is thus not migrant ‘illegality’ per se that is targeted: instead, the 
Secretary of State plays on a stereotypically racialized figure of migrant ‘illegality’, 
repeatedly played out on television, i.e. Africans ferried across the Mediterranean 
(Walters 2010: 85). Citizens are then asked to operationalize these racial assumptions. 
These characteristics are moreover formulated in a rather vague manner – ‘any 
suspicious behaviour’ suffices for calling the military police – and that seeing any 
group of dark-skinned people potentially justifies making a call. And as civil society 
actors themselves are required to look for people who meet these distinctive criteria 
– as opposed to ‘normal’ citizens, who pass the test as being not-suspicious – these 
actors produce and relay these racial assumptions throughout civil society, which has, 
through responsibilization, become the field from which governmental power is 
exercised.   
Apart from massifying migrant ‘illegality’ based on a reified image of a racialized 
group, by evoking a securitized image of human trafficking – i.e. a representation 
visible on political agendas that treats human trafficking as part of a security 
continuum (Aradau 2004: 252-253) - migrant ‘illegality’ becomes tainted with 
suspicion and lumped together with drug trafficking, terrorism, and organised crime 
(Aradau 2004: 252-253). Moreover, because it is the police and the military police - 
whose mission is the protection of internal security (Huysmans 2000: 756) – that 
citizens are required to report to, migrant illegally becomes similarly associated with 
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the bulk of security issues and as such meets with risk management and crime 
control. 
Intertwined with the racialized and securitized massification of the unwanted 
migrant, the rhetorical image appealed to is similarly individualizing. Although 
governmental power is not always disciplinary, disciplinary power and biopolitical 
power are ‘not mutually exclusive and can be articulated with each other’ (Foucault 
2003: 250), allowing the governmentalized state to use disciplinary power as a ‘figure 
of political technology’ (Foucault 1973: 205).  
 It is through disciplinary power - a broad set of techniques of surveillance considered 
as a microphysics of power - that the body is constituted as something individual 
(Foucault 2003b: 30). The figure of the ‘illegal’ migrant in this sense emerges as a 
subject to be governed by virtue of juridical and political distinctions that, dependent 
on particular political ends (Fassin 2001), categorize some people as ‘illegal.’ By virtue 
of the Linking Act and the Foreigner Administration problematizing certain aspects 
of some migrants’ existence in relation to the state’s political interests, (s)he becomes 
a ‘matter of concern’ (Brown 2015: 15). This ‘body of knowledge’ about ‘illegal’ 
migrants – which these databases in fact are - ‘insidiously objectifies those on whom 
it is applied’ (Foucault 1973: 220). A substantive set of personal information about 
the ‘illegal’ migrant is made visible to multiple actors – i.e. every actor that can access 
the Foreigner Administration System, including several civil society actors.  
As the Secretary of State then publicly represents unwanted migrants as bearers of 
visible and audible bodily characteristics, the individual body transforms into an 
object in which the alleged racial observables of migrant ‘illegality’ are inscribed. 
When responding to his call, citizens then reproduce the individualizing effect of 
power that sustains migrant illegality as an observable phenomenon. Notably, it is 
the immediate bodily activity and characteristics that people are required to attend 
to in recognizing and acting on ‘illegal’ migrants as targeted – i.e. to focus what can 
be seen and heard. The installed disciplinary power encapsulates the individual 
‘illegal’ migrant in the face of surveillance. In a public space, the unwanted migrant 
does not know whether the person (s)he bumps into intends to issue a report. The 
unwanted migrant is visible for surveillance, in the face of the potential, invisible 
non-state actors relaying power. Based on bodily characteristics, (s)he might be 
considered suspicious. 
At the intersection of the biopolitical massification, that targets the unwanted 
migrant as belonging to racialized and securitized groups, and the disciplinary 
individualization targeting the unwanted migrant as body, biopower emerges 
(Rasmussen 2001: 36-37), a notion of power Foucault particular discusses in the 
context of racism. For Foucault, racism is a basic mechanism of power as exercised 
by modern States – which can ‘scarcely function without becoming involved with 
racism at some point’ (Foucault 2003: 254) – that separates what must live, and what 
must die (Foucault 2003: 254). Whereas Rasmussen in his article starkly contrasts 
Foucault’s notion of racism with what he considers as ‘the common idea that racism, 
fundamentally, is a form of irrational prejudice, social discrimination, or political 
ideology’ (Rasmussen 2001: 35), this contrast seems to underexpose the fact that 
racism is not at all limited to state genealogies and discourses but rather to be 
observed in everyday governance. The racialized and securitized figure of the ‘illegal’ 
migrant, moreover, is not only sustained as a top-down representation. Rather, 
exactly because governmentality as an analytic framework may reveal that individual 
people are not only the objects of power but also its relays (Foucault 2003: 29), the 
tactic of responsibilization exploits this ontology of power. The figure of the ‘illegal’ 
migrant – which in the case in point does in fact seem to be constructed through 
prejudice, discrimination and ideology – is sustained by non-state actors. Clearly, the 
representation of unwanted migrants through an image of migrant ‘illegality’ that 
draws on race and security does not attend to any self-understanding of migrants 
other than their juridical and political status. This identity is ‘superimposed on daily 
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life’ (De Genova 2002: 422), is what De Genova calls the ‘everyday production of 
‘illegality’’ (De Genova 2002: 423) and is enacted from within the responsibilized 
community. 
 
6. Disregarding migrant agency: the unwanted migrant represented 
as threat to active citizenship 
Civil society actors thus reinforce the massification as well as individualization of 
unwanted migrants: both as part of the population that is isolated through listing a 
set of differentiating racial criteria in the face of ‘normal citizens’, and as reduced to 
a bodily inscribed political-juridical categorization. This image clearly omits the 
agency of migrants (Bojadžijev and Karakayalı 2010; Mezzadra 2010; 2015). Decisions 
to migrate, processes of migration itself and agency at the border are not attended to 
in the image of migrant ‘illegality’ as it stands, which confirms the tendency to 
neglect subjective stakes of contemporary migration experiences (Mezzadra 2015: 
121).  
Moreover, the unwanted migrant is likely to internalize the discipline and as such to 
inscribe the power relation (Foucault 1973, 202). Several authors have hypothesized 
on the causal relation between restrictive policies aimed at migrant ‘illegality’ and 
targeted migrants increasingly going into hiding. In her book, the Unknown City, a 
research project on ‘illegal’ migrants in the Netherlands in which she participated, 
Van der Leun notes that ‘it is a fact of life’ that ‘illegal’ migrants need to remain 
unseen by state officials and public organisations (Van der Leun 2003: 115). 
Moreover, she assumes that the stricter the enforcement regime, the more ‘illegal’ 
migrants will be pushed towards an underground existence (Van der Leun and 
Kloosterman 2006: 62). Engbersen and Broeders – the former author being involved 
in the same research project - also note that ‘illegal’ migrants are increasingly likely 
to go even deeper underground as a consequence of measures that exclude ‘illegal’ 
migrants from public services (Engbersen and Broeders 2007: 1606). Similarly, now 
that - in addition to those working in Human Service Organizations - citizens are 
invited to contribute to surveillance, this assumption probably grows in likeliness. 
As there are more ears and eyes implementing restrictive policies to hide from, the 
multiplicity of persons that may subject the unwanted migrant to the threat of being 
uncovered extends throughout the responsibilized community. 
Taken together with increased forcing of unwanted migrants into underground 
existence and as such living away from the public, the omitting of migrant agency 
hinders identifications with ‘illegal’ migrants in terms of autonomous and 
‘responsible’ agents. In the face of the ideal of citizenship that responsibilization 
draws on, and which applauds active self-entrepreneurs enacting individual 
responsibility, the abstraction from the autonomy of migrants may invigorate the 
divide between responsibilized citizens and unwanted migrants. As responsibilization 
rests on the differentiating criteria of agentive versus passive, the disregard shown to 
migrant agency inhibits a perception of them being agentive actors and as such allows 
the unwanted migrant to represent a threat to the ideal of the self-reliant and active 
responsibilized citizen. In their empirical comparative research on the ways in which 
active citizenship is promoted, Verhoeven and Tonkens (2013) found that in the 
Netherlands harbouring negative feelings of weariness towards those incapable of 
self-reliancy is being appealed to as proper. In other words, the qualification of being 
a ‛sponger’ is cultivated towards those considered incapable of meeting up to the 
requirement of being agentive (Grin 2013: 238). The promoted figure of the ‘illegal’ 
migrant, in which the autonomy of migrants is not engaged with, then seems a threat 
to the ideal of a ‘society of participation’ consisting of agentive actors capable of self-
care. 
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7. Conclusions 
The representation of ‘illegal’ employed by the Secretary of State draws on a 
securitized image of human trafficking and observable or audible characteristics such 
as dress, looks, behaviour and speech. It is thus not migrant ‘illegality’ per se, but a 
figure based on racial assumptions, placed into a security continuum. Consequently, 
this evoked image of the unwanted migrant is massified on racial grounds and is at 
the same time individualized by transforming the body into an object in which the 
alleged racial observables of migrant ‘illegality’ are inscribed.  
By inviting citizens to report on migrant ‘illegality’ through evoking this figure of 
unwanted migrants, the Dutch government places civil-society actors in a position 
where they serve the ends of the government and operationalize classifications of race 
and security. The appeal to citizens to contribute in surveillance is typically an act of 
responsibilization, which requires non-state actors to bear responsibility for public 
tasks by evoking a normative account of ‘active citizenship’.  
In the wider context of migrant management in the Netherlands, control has 
similarly been delegated outwards. Notably through the implementation of the 
Foreigner Administration System and the Linking Act - that allow Human Service 
Organizations to check on and report irregular migrants - force is exercised 
throughout the responsibilized community. Governmentality as an analytic lens 
reveals that through responsibilization non-state actors become part of the capillary 
network from which governmental power is put into effect.  
The representation of migrant ‘illegality’ undermines the subjectivity and agency of 
unwanted migrants. As the premise of ‘active citizenship’ that underlies 
responsibilization draws on a divide between those enacting agency and individual 
responsibility, disregarding the autonomy of migrants, articulations of their agentive 
experience are hindered. Given the apparent legitimacy of harbouring negative 
feelings towards those ¬considered to fail the requirements of active citizenship, the 
‘illegal’ migrant, whose autonomy is abstracted from, then seems incompatible with 
the image of a responsibilized community.  
Subsequent research is needed to further grasp the practice of responsibilization in 
the governance of migrant ‘illegality’ in the Netherlands. Given that apparatuses of 
security are the essential mechanism of governmental management (Foucault 2007, 
108), knowing how security strategies inform responsibilization tactics would 
contribute to an understanding of how these appeals to citizens are to be positioned 
in the face of what the role of the contemporary state is in relation to citizens. 
Moreover, qualitative ethnographical research on migrants’ subjective practices is 
needed to articulate the autonomy of migrants and to understand experiences of 
being governed from within the community sphere itself.  
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